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RECENT CASES

husband's place of business lies south of and midway between his
home and the restaurant where he and his wife drank and dined
prior to the accident. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff and her
husband were travelling away from the interchange where they
normally turned toward the place of employment, and thus were
actually travelling away from their purported destination and toward
their home. The plaintiff explains this by stating that her husband had
missed the turn and was driving to the next interchange. The accident
occurred near midnight which was four or five hours after they had
left home, and during this period, the plaintiff and her husband were
drinking. These events would not normally be beneficial to nor planned
us
in accordance with, a trip made in the "scope of employment."
Clearly, if a wife is to recover from her husband's employer, she must
establish in some way that her husband was acting for his employer.
On facts such as these, the wife and her husband needed only to agree
that they had missed the turnoff, rather than to admit that they were
actually on their way home.
In holding as it did, the Delaware court flaunted reality in two
ways. First, the court overlooked the availability of indemnity actions,
thereby ignoring defendant's argument of indirection and failing to
foresee the real possibility of an indemnity action against the husband,
which would negate the wife's recovery. Second, cases of this type
must be carefully analyzed for the possibility of collusion and fraud.
The court must be extremely cautious in applying this rule, which now
is a moot question in Kentucky,' 9 because a husband and his wife are
so related that they may easily collude to establish that the husband
was acting within the scope of his employment.
John D. McCann

TORTS-NEGLIGENcE-FREEDOM FROM ILLEGITIMATE

BIRTH.-A mentally

deficient woman in a state mental hospital was raped by a male patient.
An illegitimate infant was born, on whose behalf a suit was brought
against the state. Predicated upon allegedly negligent care of the
mother, damages were sought for the stigma of illegitimacy, deprivation of property rights, and loss of normal childhood and home life.
Denying the motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action,
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§ 219(2) (1957).

The question is moot because the marital immunity no longer exists in
Kentucky. Brown v. Gosser, 202 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1958), held that a wife can
sue her husband in tort.
1
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the New York Court of Claims held that an infant born out of wedlock
to a mother confined in a state mental hospital had a cause of action
against the state, whose allegedly negligent supervision allowed a
carnal assault.1 The Appellate Division reversed, holding there was no
public policy basis for recognizing a cause of action grounded, first,
upon a state's obligation to a person yet to be conceived and, second,
upon allegations of damages so requiring an incursion into the metaphysical for measurement as not to be susceptible of ascertainment.2
The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. Held: Affirmed. Even though the child may have to bear unfair burdens,
illegitimacy is not a suable wrong for which the law provides cure or
compensation because the policy and social reasons against compensation are at least as strong as those favoring it. WilItams v. State, 46
Misc. 2d 824, 260 N.Y.S. 2d 953 (Ct. Cl. 1965), rev'd, Williams v. State,
269 N.Y.S.2d 786 (App. Div. 1966), aff'd, Williams v.State, 35 U.S.L.
W=EK 2886 (Dec. 29, 1966).
Prior to reversal, Williams was the first recognition of a cause of
action for harm inherent in the status of illegitimacy. An earlier case,
Zepeda v. Zepeda,3 also sought a cause of action for the stigma of
illegitimacy. In Zepeda, however, an adulterine bastard sued her
natural father for damages. The Zepeda court believed the elements of
a new tort were presented and ventured the name, "wrongful life."
Yet the court denied a cause of action, believing that recognition of the
tort would result in such a flood of litigation that a study of the
consequences should first be made by the legislature. While disliking
the name, "wrongful life," 4 the lower court in Williams believed the
creation of a bastard due to alleged negligence of a state hospital was
an actionable wrong.
The Williams holding in the lower Court was only conceptually
radical for "new and nameless torts are being recognized constantly,
and the progress of the common law is marked by many cases of first
impression in which the court has struck out boldly to create a new
cause of action, where none had existed before." 5 The law is increasingly providing remedies for once unrecognized intangible injuries such as infliction of mental suffering, invasion of privacy, and
alienation of parental affection.
The appellate division found the state could not owe a duty to an
'Williams v. State, 46 Misc.

2d 824, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Ct. C1. 1965).

2 Williams

v. State, 269 N.Y.S.2d 786, 787 (App. Div. 1966).
341 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied,
(1964).
4 Id. at 959.
5
PRossmn, TORTS § 1, at 3 (3d ed. 1964).

376 U.S. 945
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unconceived person. Yet such a duty, while unusual, is not foreign to
existing law. From the initial recognition of a cause of action for injuries to an infant en ventre sa mere,6 to the recent cases eliminating
the absolute requirement of viability of the foetus," American law is
apparently permitting a cause of action closer and closer to the instant of conception. The logical extension would be a cause of action
prior to conception. That extension has been made in Germany. An infant was born with congenital syphilis caused by a hospital's negligently administering a transfusion of syphilitic blood to his mother.
It was held immaterial that the wrongful act occurred months prior to
the plaintiff's conception." The injury to the Williams infant, however,
was not physical. But a cause of action for injuries prior to conception
need not be physical. Piper v. Hoard' held that a plaintiff may maintain an action for a wrong inflicted before conception. The plaintiffs
mother was induced by the defendant to marry a third party on the
fraudulent promise that any offspring would inherit land. The plaintiff issue was allowed an action for recovery of land based on fraud
prior to conception. It is thus easy to see that the state in Williams
could owe a duty to the unconceived plaintiff to prevent her illegitimate birth.
Before discussing the difficulty of assessing damages, it is important

to see if damages are legally justified. Does an illegitimate birth produce harm, and if so, is it a type of harm the law has ever redressed?
Compensable liability is usually based on an unreasonable interference
with interests of others. Does an infant have a legal interest in a legitimate birth? Yes, for a legal right which children have always possessed
is the right to be considered legitimate if at all possible. "Pursuant to
one of the strongest presumptions in the law, a child has a right to be
legitimate if such a status can be inferred in any way from conditions
surrounding the birth of the child."10 The reason the law guards a
child's legitimacy is to prevent the social harm inherent in an illegitimate status. "The bastard, like the prostitute, thief, and begger belongs
to that motley crowd of disreputable social types which society has
generally resented. .

.

. He is a symbol of social irregularity, an

undeniable evidence of contra-moral forces, in short, a problem.""
6

Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).

78 Daley v. Meier, 83 IMI.App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961).
Note, 66 COLum. L. REv. 127, 184 n.63, (1966).
9 107 N.Y. 73, 13 N.E. 626 (1887).

10 Drinan, The Rights of Children in Modern American Family Law, 2 J.
FAa LY L. 101, 103 (1962); Wallace v. Wallace, 137 Iowa 37, 114 N.W. 527
(1908); Dudley's Adm'r v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 240 S.W.2d 76 (Ky. 1951).
"149 IowA L. Rzv. 1005 (1964), quoting Davis, Illegitimacy andi the Social
Structure, 45 Azmuuc~x J. oF SocioLoGY 215 (1939).

KENTUcKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55,

Legislatures have recognized the problems illegitimacy can cause and
have improved the economic and legal status of bastards. The disparity
in the rights of intestate succession of legitimates and illegitimates has
been corrected in Arizona and Oregon.1 2 In Kentucky, fathers of
illegitimates are financially liable for support just as if the children
were legitimate. 3
The essence of the wrong, however, is not economic inequality. The
Zepeda court said that illegitimates suffer a real injury-they have been
placed "under a permanent disability." 4 That disability is a social
stigma which legislatures have recognized. Various records and procedures once required in bastardy hearings are being eliminated to
reduce publicity and resultant stigmatization. 5 But no law can
effectively remove a stigma created by society. A stigma, a mark of
infamy or disgrace, has been defined as conferring shame or discredit.' 6
A stigma is thus an intangible injury akin to mental distress, social
embarrassment, and harm to reputation, all of which the lav redresses.
Only a change in societal concepts of morality can remove the stigma.
As long as a stigma accompanies bastardy, should not an innocent
child recover damages for an injury corresponding to injuries the law
has previously recognized as redressable.
Seeing that damages can be justified, it is next necessary to consider assessment. In any new problem encountered by the courts, damages are indeed difficult to assess due to a lack of precedent. Fears of
fraudulent claims and problems of measurement have characteristically
been excuses of expediency in new developments of the law. The
mental suffering and right of privacy actions were shackled by similar
reasoning for years. Yet those intangible injuries the law now recompenses. Damages for the intangible injury inherent in the stigma of
illegitimacy could similarily be assessed.
An estimate of damage should be limited to the "social stigma"
category of harm. Rights of property and support are commonly regulated by statute. Deprivation of normal childhood and home life cannot be assessed during infancy. Illegitimate children may be adopted.
They may experience a happier childhood than many legitimate children. Only after reaching adulthood could such a harm then be
measured in retrospect. The harm to be recompensed-a social stigma12 Comment, 18 STAN. L. REv. 530, 532 (1966). But see Ky. REv. STAT. §
391.090 1942 [hereinafter cited as KRS].
13 KRS § 406.011 (1964).
14 Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849, 857 (1963),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964).
15 In 1964, the following statutes were repealed in Kentucky: KRS §§ 406.010,
406.020,
406.030, 406.140, 406.160 (1942).
16
WEBsTER. Timu NEw INTERNATIONAL DICamONARY 2243 (1966).
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must therefore be a type which every illegitimate can know, whether
later legitimized or not. The injury is an insidious form of mental
distress peculiar to his status.
Construed broadly, Williams in the Court of Claims would have
allowed a cause of action for damages against parents of illegitimates.
The Court of Appeals of New York stated that being born to one set
of parents rather than another is not an actionable wrong. Both courts
exceeded the scope of the problem, for parents were not involved.
Admittedly, the character of the question changes when the rights
and liabilities of private individuals are brought to bear on a theory of
conception resulting from the negligence of parents. Williams should
have been narrowly confined to the concept of non-parental third party
defendants, such as public or private organizations having an affimative duty of care to ensure that persons in its charge are not sexually
molested. Such a limitation of the class of defendants would effectively
eliminate so-called "flood of litigation" fears and greatly simplify the
measurement of damages.
Robert K. Wood

